Jul 21, 14
The following bolding is my own. Italics belong to the English text (trans. Dahlstrom) of Ideas 1. Section 118:
"If we take any individual experience, it is constituted as a unity spread out in phenomenological time. a unity in the continuous "original" time-consciousness. If we adopt a suitable, reflective attitude, we can attend to the manner of givenness, in consciousness, of stretches of experience belonging to to various segments of the duration of the experience. In keeping with this, we can then say that the entire consciousness constituting this unity of duration is continuously composed of segments in which the segments of the experience of duration are constituted. In this way, the noeses not only combine with one another but instead constitute one noesis with one noema (the filled-up duration of experience), which is founded on the noemas of the combined noeses. The same thing that holds for one individual experience holds for the entire stream of experience. However alien to one another experiences might essentially be. they are collectively constituted as one stream of time, as members of the one phenomenological time."
Now, think whether the last bolded statement holds up for experiences that include elements of historical sedimentation, which are, in a sense, constituted in our stream of phenomenological time by being excluded from it -- that is, the mode of access to historically-sedimented layers of experience is one of "founding upon," but what is "being founded upon" is not accessible in an original way (except by some possible, imaginable historical subject, which is also not accessible in an originary way to the temporal subject). (And does the break between the temporal and historical also track the break between the subject and the inter-subjective?)
[Criticism: There are many sorts of experiences direct us to "objects" that are "inaccessible" in an originary but nonetheless captured within the same flow of phenomenological time. Memories, phantasies, etc. What makes historical sedimentation different? //// Reply: The inaccessiblity of historical sediment is in principle different from the inaccessibility of any other intentional object of consciousness because -- unlike memories, phantasies, etc. -- the sediment, as a layer of a complex, cannot be experienced independently. It is always parasitic on the present; and its route to fulfillment precisely involves its overcoming (which is not a negation, not a confirmation, not a fictionalizing). History comes to be as overcome. The space of history in phenomenological time is determined by a displacement outside of that time (which equally displaces before time as well as behind time -- hence, history (backwards) is always wrapped up in destiny (forwards)). That's its only mode of manifestation. This clearly needs more clarification.]